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Do Transportation Costs Matter? 
Abstract 
The paper presents a formal analysis which incorporates returns to transportation into a Ricardian 
framework to predict trade patterns. The important point to be gained from this analysis is that 
increasing returns to transportation, coupled with appropriate distances between trading partners 
can be shown to reverse Ricardian predictions even when there are no international differences in 
tastes, technology, or factor endowments. Additional gains from trade may emerge from 
reductions in aggregate delivery costs owing to scale economies. 
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1 Introduction 
The theory of comparative advantage is one of the most fundamental insights economics is 
providing to explain actual patterns of international trade. The standard model of comparative 
advantage that relies on differences in labour productivity was introduced by David Ricardo in 
1817 and is generally referred to as the Ricardian model (see Ricardo, 1963). There are two key 
contributions of the Ricardian model to trade theory. First, it shows that trade can arise because of 
international differences in technology. More specifically, it establishes that in a one-factor world 
with two-traded goods produced under CES and perfect competition, the pattern of trade is 
determined by international differences in relative costs with each country exporting the good in 
which it has a relative labour productivity advantage. Second, it makes clear that voluntary trade 
cannot be welfare reducing for any of the parties involved. Typically, the analysis is conducted in 
a two−good, two−country, one−factor model and assumes zero transportation costs between the 
countries. The role of transportation costs is a major theme in regional science. Because transport 
costs pose obstacles to the movement of goods and services, they have important implications for 
the way a trading world economy is affected (see, e.g. Isard and Peck, 1954). Nonetheless, 
transportation costs have received little attention from formal trade theory. The main reason for 
this neglect seems to be that it has appeared difficult to deal with the implications of increasing 
returns to transportation in formal models. 
This paper attempts to introduce the idea of increasing returns to transportation into a two−good 
Ricardian model to trade theory. It helps to establish that the presence of returns to transportation, 
coupled with appropriate distances between trading partners, gives rise to new possibilities. First, 
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trade patterns may differ from those predicted by the classical theory of comparative advantage. 
Second, additional gains from trade may emerge from reductions in aggregate delivery costs 
owing to scale economies. 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 the classical two−country two−good Ricardian 
model is extended to a three-country version in a world characterized by increasing returns to 
transportation. This is followed by a discussion in Section 3 that the presence of increasing returns 
to transportation may cause trade between identical countries and this trade is beneficial to all. 
Section 4 continues to provide a formal justification for the argument that in a three−country 
world increasing returns to transportation may reverse Ricardian trade pattern predictions. Finally, 
Section 5 summarizes the results and suggests some conclusions. 
 
2. The Modified Ricardian Model: Assumptions and Equilibrium 
A. Assumptions of the model  
The structure of this model is closely related to the classical two−good Ricardian model, 
but departs from traditional analysis through the combination of a three−country version of the 
model along with the introduction of iceberg transport costs. We consider a world of three 
countries, say A, B, and C. To make the point most clearly we follow the simplifications made in 
the two−good Ricardian model. We assume a one−factor two−good economy. Each of the three 
countries has only one scarce factor of production, labour, available in quantities LA, LB, and LC, 
and can produce two goods, say z and w. The technology of each country can be described by the 
productivity of labour in each industry. It is convenient to express productivity in terms of the unit 
labour requirement, the number of hours required to produce one unit of each. We label country's 
J∈{A, B, C} unit labour requirement for a particular good i∈{z,w} as aLiJ. In general, the unit 
labour requirements can follow any pattern, but we are assuming that country A has a 
comparative advantage in producing z relative to the other two countries considered, that is 
 
(1) aLzA/aLwA  < aLzJ/aLwJ   (J∈{B,C}). 
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To make the point most strongly, the countries are assumed to have identical tastes and share the same utility 
function from which the consumption pattern may be derived  
 
(2) U(ZJ,WJ) = ZJ1−α WJα     (J∈{A,B,C}),  
 
where ZJ and WJ denote respectively quantities of commodity z and w, α is a fixed coefficient 
(0<α<1) so that relative demand in country J is given by  
 
(3) ZJ/WJ = [(1−α)/α]/PJ    (J∈{A,B,C})  
 
where PJ denotes the relative price of z, Pz/Pw, in country J.1 The functional form of the utility 
function chosen gives the model a simplified structure which makes the analysis easier. 
 
Transportation costs will be assumed to take Samuelson's (1954) "iceberg" form in which 
transport costs are incurred in the goods transported. Of each unit of good shipped from one 
country to another only a fraction g≤1 arrives. This is a strong assumption that has to be made for 
tractability. But in contrast to Dornbush, Fisher and Samuelson (1977) the idea of increasing 
returns to transportation is introduced so that a step closer to reality is made by considering the 
effects of transport costs. 
 
Let  gJ,K(qi) denote the transportation costs of the quantity q of good i from country J to 
country K with J,K∈{A,B,C}, J≠K. Specifically, we assume that gJ,K(qi) with qi≥0 is a continuous 
and increasing function of qi, inversely proportional to dJ,K, the distance between J and K [that is,    
gJ,K(qi) > gM,N (qi), iff dJ,K < dM,N], and identical for shipments in either direction [that is, gJ,K (qi) = 
gK,J  (qi)]. Finally, for the sake of simplicity let us assume that there exists a set of model 
3 
Jacek Cukrowsky and Manfred M. Fischer (2000) 
parameters, such that if free trade is allowed in the three−country world the differences in 
productivity lead to full specialization in the countries. Country A specializes in production of 
good z and countries B and C in production of commodity w.2 
 
It seems useful to represent the three countries as discrete points in space exogenously 
defined, for example, as shown in figure 1. We consider two distinct cases as illustrated in figure 
1: direct trade (case I) and indirect trade (case II). Countries B and C are identical in every 
respect. Country A has different opportunity costs of producing z. Its distance from B is smaller 
than from C. In case I countries B and C trade directly with A (see figure 1(a)); in case II, B and 
C form a new integrated economy that trades as a unit with A (see figure 1(b)). 
 
POSITION FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
B. Equilibrium in the model  
 
Let us denote the quantities of goods z and w exported from country J to country K (J,K∈{A,B,C}) as ZJ,K and WJ,K, 
respectively. If K=J, then ZJ,K and WJ,K denote quantities supplied in the domestic market. Then we can easily characterize the world 
economy's equilibrium in the case of direct trade (case I) by means of the following ten equations. The superscript I serves to indicate 
the unknown variables in case I.  
 
(4) LA/aLzA   =  ZA,AI + ZA,BI + ZA,CI     
 
(5) LB/aLwB  = WB,BI + WB,AI   
 
(6) LC/aLwC = WC,CI + WC,AI 
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(7) ZA,AI / [WB,AI  gA,B (WB,AI) + WC,AI  gA,C (WC,AI)] = [(1−α) /α] /PAI  
 
(8) ZA,BI  gA,B (ZA,BI) /WB,BI    = [(1−α) /α]/PBI  
 
(9) ZA,CI  gA,C (ZA,CI) / WC,CI  = [(1−α) /α]/PCI  
 
(10) ZA,BI  gA,B (ZA,BI) PBI      = WB,AI 
 
(11) WB,AI  gA,B (WB,AI)/PAI   = ZA,BI 
 
(12) ZA,CI  gA,C (ZA,CI) PCI      = WC,AI 
 
(13) WC,AI  gA,C (WC,AI) / PAI   = ZA,CI 
 
Equations (4)−(6) characterize the production possibilities in the three−country one−factor 
two−good world, while equations (7)−(9) describe market equilibria in the countries, that 
is, equalize relative supply with relative demand. Equations (10)−(13) exclude the 
possibility of the gain from buying goods in one market and selling them in another. The 
solution to the system of equations (4)−(13) determines values of the ten unknown 
variables: WB,BI, WB,AI, WC,CI, WC,AI, ZA,AI, ZA,BI, ZA,CI, PAI, PBI, PCI. 
 
In the case of indirect trade (case II) the equilibrium − under full specialization − is 
described as follows where the superscript II denotes the unknown variables: 
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(14)    LA/aLzA   =  ZA,AII + ZA,BII  
 
(15) LB/aLwB  =  WB,BII + WB,AII  
 
(16) LC/aLwC  =  WC,CII  + WC,BII  
 
(17) ZA,AII / [(WB,AII + WC,BII  gC,B (WC,BII)) gA,B (WB,AII + WC,BII  gC,B (WC,BII))] = [(1−α) / α]/PAII 
 
(18)  [ZA,BII  gA,B (ZA,BII) − ZB,CII] / WB,BII   =  [(1−α) / α]/PBII  
 
(19) ZB,CII  gB,C (ZB,CII) / WC,CII  =  [(1−α) / α] / PCII  
 
(20)  [ZA,BII  gA,B (ZA,BII) − ZB,CII ] PBII   = WB,AII  
 
(21)  [WB,AII  + WC,BII  gC,B (WC,BII)] gA,B (WB,AII + WC,BII  gC,B (WC,BII)) / PAII  = ZA,BII 
 
(22) ZB,CII  gB,C (ZB,CII) PCII  = WC,BII  
 
(23) WC,BII  gC,B (WC,BII) / PBII  = ZB,CII   
 
Equations (14)−(16) characterize the production possibilities in the three countries A, B and C, and equations (17)−(19) 
the market equilibria. Equations (20)−(23) exclude the possibility of the gain from buying goods in one market 
and selling them in another. The solution to the system of equations (14)−(23) specifies the values of WB,BII, 
WB,AII, WC,CII, WC,BII, ZA,AII, ZA,BII, ZB,CII, PAII, PBII, PCII.  
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In particular, quantities of goods are determined in the cases of direct trade (I) and indirect trade (II) as: 
(24) WB,BI = WB,BII =α LB / aLwB, 
 
(25) WB,AI = WB,AII = (1-α) LB / aLwB, 
 
(26) WC,CI = WC,CII = α LC / aLwC, 
 
(27) WC,AI = WC,BII = (1-α) LC / aLwC, 
 
(28) ZA,AI = ZA,AII = (1-α) LA / aLzA, 
 
(29)   ZA,BI = (α LA / aLzA) / {1+ (LC / aLwC) gA,C ((1-α) LC / aLwC) / [(LB / aLwB) gA,B ((1-α)LB / aLwB)]},  
 
(30) ZA,CI = (α LA / aLzA ) /{1+ (LB / aLwB ) gA,B ((1-α) LB / aLwB) / [(LC / aLwC) gA,C ((1-α) LC / aLwC)]}, 
 
(31) ZA,BII = α LA / aLzA, 
 
(32)  ZB,CII  = α LA / aLzA  gA,B (α  LA / aLzA) /{1 + (LB / aLwB) / [(LC / aLwC)  gC,B ((1−α) LC/ aLwC)]}; 
 
and relative prices in the countries as 
 
(33) PAI = [WB,AI  gA,B (WB,AI) + WC,AI  gA,C (WC,AI)] / [ZA,AI  α /(1-α)], 
 
(34)   PAII = [(WB,AII + WC,BII  gC,B (WC,BII)) gA,B (WB,AII + WC,BII  gC,B (WC,BII))] / [ZA,AII α / (1-α)], 
 
(35) PBI  = WB,AI  / [ZA,BI gA,B (ZA,BI)],  
 
(36) PBII = [WB,AII + WC,BII  gC,B (WC,BII)] / [ZA,BII gA,B (ZA,BII)],  
 
(37) PCI = WC,AI  / [ZA,CI gA,C (ZA,CI)],  
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(38) PCII = WC,BII  / [ZB,CII gB,C (ZB,CII)];  
 
so that, free trade equlibria in both cases are fully specified. 
 
3. INTERNATIONAL TRADE BETWEEN IDENTICAL COUNTRIES  
 
If commodities z and w can be traded either directly (case I) or indirectly (case II) then indirect trade 
prevails in the three−country world that all three countries are better off than under direct trade. Recall from 
the standard course of international economics that a rise in terms of trade (the price of country’s exports 
divided by the price of its imports) increases a country’s welfare, while a decline in terms of trade reduces its 
welfare (see, e.g., Krugman and Obstfeld, 1991, for details). Thus, all three countries considered are always 
better off under indirect trade iff  (a) PAI < PAII , (b) PBI > PBII, and (c) PCI > PCII.  
 
The proposition below states that under increasing returns to transportation there exists a spatial 
configuration such that indirect trade prevails, and, consequently, international trade between two countries 
identical in all respects (B and C) can be observed. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: The presence of increasing returns to transportation may cause trade 
between identical economies in a three−country world and increase bilateral 
welfare. 
 
Proof of PROPOSITION 1: We proceed in two stages. Stage 1: Consider countries B and C 
which are identical in every respect and the distance dB,C between them is zero. Next introduce country A in 
which (i) the opportunity cost of producing a particular good differs from the other two, and (ii) its distance 
from B and C is the same, that is dA,B=dA,C. Now consider two possibilities. In the first, countries B and C 
trade directly with A; in the second, B and C form a new integrated economy that trades as a unit with A. The 
latter case is a superior alternative for all countries because − by the built in symmetry in transportation costs 
over the two traded goods, and the decline of these costs due to larger traded volumes − all countries can 
enjoy an improvement in their terms of trade, if countries B and C exploit economies of scale in 
transportation. The formal proof is straightforward: PAI < PAII, PBI > PBII and PCI > PCII, since gB,C (⋅)=1, WB,AII 
+ WC,BII = 2 WB,AI, ZA,BII = 2 ZA,BI, and WC,AI = WC,BII 3. 
 
Stage 2: We raise the distance and, thus, the transportation costs between B and C. Country C 
becomes located further from both trading partners. Specifically, let us assume that country A is located in 
point O and country B in point X as illustrated in figure 2. Let us shift now country C along line OX further 
apart from O and X. If the distance between B and C increases then the terms of trade of all three countries 
change under direct trade. In particular, PAII and PBII decrease (since gC,B (⋅) decreases), and PCII increases 
(since both ZB,CII and gC,B (⋅) decrease). Thus, the terms of trade of A and C deteriorate (countries A and C are 
worse off) and those of country B improve (country B is better off)4. Consequently, due to continuity of 
space, there exists a location of country C (say, at point Y, in figure 2) such that at least one country C or A is 
indifferent between direct and indirect trade, but for all location points, say Vi, such thatXVi<XY and 
OVi>OX (see figure 2) all three countries prefer indirect trade. Thus, for any location point of country 
B there exists a non-empty set of location points of country C, such that, even if countries are identical in all 
respects, and there is no any natural pattern of comparative advantage between countries B and C, both 
countries will benefit from international trade.  
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It is important to note that indirect trade prevails only in the area where economies of scale from 
transportation exceed increased distance cost required for shipment between countries A and C. 
 
POSITION FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
4. REVERSING BILATERAL PATTERN OF TRADE  
 
Consider the model presented in Section 2 and assume that countries B and C differ in productivities. 
In particular, assume that country B has comparative advantage in producing good w and country C in 
producing of good z (suppose that aLzB = aLzC and aLwB < aLwC, so that aLwB/aLzB < aLwC/aLzC). In a two−country 
world, according to the theory of comparative advantage, country B would export good w and import good z, 
and country C would export good z and import good w. Suppose, as above, that there is a third country A 
which is much more than all other countries productive in z and much less in w, so that in the three−country 
world A specializes in production of z and countries B and C in production of w. Similarly, as in the analysis 
above, under free trade regime commodities can be exchanged between countries A and B as well as A and C 
directly (see figure 1(a)) or indirectly (see figure 1(b)). Assume that country B is located closer to A. When 
goods are traded indirectly it can serve as an intermediary (i.e., country B imports good z from country A and 
exports it to country C). Note, however, that if this is the case then the pattern of trade between countries B 
and C is just opposite to one which follows from the Law of Comparative Advantage, i.e., country B exports 
(to C) good z and imports good w, and country C exports to B good w and imports good z, even though 
country B has comparative advantage in the production of good w and country C in the production of good z. 
In the analysis below we will show that if transportation costs face increasing returns to scale, there exists a 
spatial configuration of countries A, B and C such that the pattern of trade described above prevails. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: In a one−factor world with three countries and two-traded goods increasing 
returns in transportation, coupled with appropriate distances between 
trading partners, may reverse Ricardian trade pattern predictions in so far 
that free trade does not reflect bilateral comparative advantages between 
pairs of countries. 
 
Proof of PROPOSITION 2: The proof the proposition includes the same stages as that of 
PROPOSITION 1. Stage 1: Consider the hypothetical situation where B and C are identical in every aspect 
and dB,C = 0. Compare case I (direct trade) and case II (indirect trade). 
 
Since gB,C (⋅) = 1, aLwB < aLwC, WB,AII = WB,AI, WC,BII = WC,AI, the proof that PAI < PAII is straightforward. 
PBI > PBII if the following inequality is satisfied  
 
(39) WB,AI / [ZA,BI gA,B (ZA,BI)] > [WB,AII + WC,BII gC,B (ZC,BII)] / [ZA,BII gA,B (ZA,BII)]  
 
Taking into account equations (25) and (27) and rearranging, we get  
 
(40) [ZA,BII gA,B (ZA,BII)] / [ZA,BI gA,B (ZA,BI)] > 1 +  aLwB / aLwC. 
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If countries B and C are identical the inequality above is surely satisfied (since aLwB/aLwC = 1, and ZA,BII 
= 2 ZA,BI) 5. To show that there exist unit labour requirements aLwB and aLwC, such that aLwB<aLwC (i.e., that 
aLwB/aLwC < 1) which satisfy the inequality above consider left hand side of (40). Since ZA,BII does not depend 
on the ratio aLwB/aLwC and ZA,BI increases if  aLwB/aLwC becomes smaller (see equation (29)), the left hand side 
of (40) decreases if aLwB/aLwC decreases. Taking into account that the left hand side of (40) can be expressed 
as 
 
(41) ]
)/)((1
)/)((1
[1
)(
)(
B
Lw
B
BA,
C
Lw
C
CA,
C
Lw
B
Lw
I
BA,BA,
II
BA,BA,
aLαg
aLαg
a
a 
Zg
Zg
−
−
+ ,  
 
if aLwB/aLwC goes to zero it goes to a certain positive value smaller than gA,B (ZA,BII) < 1. On the other side the 
right hand side of inequality (40) goes to one if aLwB/aLwC goes to zero. Since, both sides of inequality (40) can 
be considered as continuous functions of aLwB/aLwC (aLwB/aLwC∈(0,1]), and for aLwB/aLwC = 1 the inequality (40) 
is always satisfied while for sufficiently small ratio aLwB/aLwC is not, there exists an interval, say (θ,1] (0 < θ < 
1), such that for all aLwB/aLwC∈(θ,1], inequality (40) is fulfilled, and, consequently, PBI>PBII.  
 
To show that PCI>PCII consider inequality6:  
 
(42) WC,AI / ZA,CI gA,C (ZA,CI) > WC,BII / ZB,CII.  
 
Since WC,BII=WC,AI (see equation (27)) the inequality above is surely satisfied if ZA,CI gA,C (ZA,CI) < ZB,CII . 
Taking into account that7  
 
(43)  
)/)((1
)/)((1
1
/
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B
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B
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B
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B
AB,
C
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and (since LB = LC and gB,C (⋅) = 1) 
 
(44)  B
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C
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A
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Z
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we get 
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The inequality above is always fulfilled, since 
 
(46)  
)/)((1
)/)((1
1 C
Lw
C
BA
B
Lw
B
Lw
B
BA
C
Lw
aLαga
aLαga
−
−
+ > BLw
C
Lw aa /1+   
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and  
 
(47)  )(,
I
CA,CA Zg < )/(,
A
Lz
A
BA aLg α . 
 
Stage 2: This proof is identical as in the proof of PROPOPSITION 1. We focus on indirect trade since 
this case is a superior alternative for all countries. Country C now becomes further located from countries B 
and A, then PAII and PBII decrease since gC,B (⋅) decreases, and PCII increases since both ZB,CII and gC,B (⋅) 
decrease. Thus, terms of trade of A and C deteriorate while those of country B improve. Consequently, there 
exists at least one location point for which C or A is indifferent between direct and indirect trade, but for all 
location points closer to B, such that dC,A>dC,B all three countries prefer indirect trade. Hence, for any 
location of country B there exists a non-empty set of location points of country C such that the pattern of 
trade (between countries B and C) opposite to one predicted by the theory of comparative advantage can be 
observed.  
 
Note that if transportation costs face increasing returns the pattern of trade predicted by the theory of 
comparative advantage can be reversed even if transportation costs are identical in either direction (i.e., 
symmetric). If transportation costs are asymmetric then in addition to comparative advantage (disadvantage) 
in productivities, countries have also comparative advantage (disadvantage) in transportation, which has to be 
taken into account when the pattern of trade based on overall comparative advantage is determined, but this 
case is beyond the scope of the present analysis. 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
It has been widely recognized that differences in technology or factor endowments create a 
base for international trade. Differences in transportation costs have been usually neglected in 
formal trade theory. Such costs are either assumed to be zero, as in classical Ricardian or 
Heckscher-Ohlin models, or infinite, as in the case of domestic goods, and rather exceptionally 
there is something in between. In reality, however, they always exist. Since they can change the 
predictions of the classical models their integration appears to be useful in understanding trade 
among industrial countries.  
 
The paper introduces increasing returns to transportation into a three-country version of the Ricardian model to trade theory in 
a one-factor world with two-traded goods. The model presented relies on restrictive assumptions. But this enables us to show that 
bilateral trade needs not to be the result of international differences in technology. Trade between two countries may also result from 
economies of scale to transportation.  
 
It is important to recognize that increasing returns to transportation alone are not responsible for the main results of the paper. 
The results do depend on distance and the particular differences in technology assumed across countries. They should be viewed as 
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complementary rather than as being in conflict with the theory of comparative advantage. We hope that the paper will stimulate further 
research to give economies of scale in transportation a more prominent place in trade theory in future. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 It follows from the solution to the following optimization problem:         
   α
J
α
J
WZ
JZ
−1
JW,
max ,    s.t. MPWPZ J
wJ
J
zJ
=+ ,  
 where PzJ, PwJ  denote market prices of commodities z and w in country J, and M denotes the income of a single 
worker.  
2 One can check that for aLzA = 1, aLwA = 2, aLzB = aLzC = 6, aLwB = aLwC = 3, α = 1/4, LA = 100, LB = LC = 50, and 
small transportation costs country A produces only commodity z and exchange it for commodity w that is 
produced in countries A and B (countries B and C produce only commodity w).  
3 Assuming that countries B and C are identical implies that LB = LC , aLwB = aLwC and  
 aLzB = aLzC. 
4 Since ZA,BII is constant and ZB,CII decreases if the distance dB,C between countries B and C increases, the 
difference ZA,BII − ZB,CII  increases, i.e., country B consumes more of commodity w for the same volume of 
commodity z exported.  
5 See equations (29) and (31) and note that dA,B = dA,C. 
6 See equations (37) and (38), and set gB,C (ZB,CII) = 1. 
7  See equations (30) and set LB = LC. 
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FIGURE 1: Possible Patterns of Goods Exchange: Direct Trade (Case I) and Indirect Trade (Case II) 
 
FIGURE 2: Spatial Configuration of Countries A, B and C 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper makes a modest attempt to shed some light on the role of space in the creation of 
technological knowledge in Austria. The study is exploratory rather than explanatory in nature and 
based on descriptive techniques such as Moran's I test for spatial autocorrelation and the Moran 
scatterplot. Clusters of the knowledge 'output' [measured in terms of patent counts] are compared 
with spatial concentration patterns of two input measures of knowledge production: private R&D 
and academic research. In addition, employment in manufacturing is utilised to capture 
agglomeration economies. The analysis is based on data aggregated for two digit SIC industries 
and at the level of Austrian political districts. It explores the extent to which knowledge spillovers 
are mediated by spatial proximity in Austria. A time-space comparison makes it possible to study 
whether divergence or convergence processes in knowledge creation have occurred in the past two 
decades. As in the case of any exploratory data analysis, the findings need to be treated with 
caution and should be viewed only as an initial pre-modelling stage in the enterprise. Future 
research activities will be devoted to further exploring the issue of local university knowledge 
spillovers within a refined production framework (see Griliches 1979). 
1 Introduction 
2 Methodology and Data  
In this current study Moran's I statistic is used. Moran's I is based on cross-products to measure 
value association: 
I = (n/S0) Σi Σj wij (xi -µ)(xj - µ) / Σi(xi -µ)2 (1) 
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Tab. 1: Sectotral distribution of Austrian patent applications in the periods 1982-1989 and  
1990-1997 
 Time Period Percentage 
Change from 
1982-1989 to 
1990-1997 
1982-1989 1990-1997 
Sectoral Share of Patents in Total Patents in Manufacturing    
Machinery 26.02 24.52 -5.75 
Metal Products excluding Machines 18.18 19.97 9.87 
Instruments 9.48 10.64 12.27 
Transportation Vehicles 9.23 8.47 -8.29 
Chemistry and Pharmaceuticals 8.33 7.30 -12.39 
Electrical Machinery 6.86 6.54 -4.73 
Construction 5.53 5.26 -4.88 
Stone, Clay and Glass Products 3.73 3.39 -9.1 
Paper, Printing and Publishing 2.53 3.29 30.07 
Electronics 2.61 2.78 6.46 
Basic Metals 2.62 2.52 -3.73 
Textiles and Clothes 1.87 1.38 -26.49 
Computers and Office Machines 0.77 1.35 75.95 
Food, Beverages, Tobacco 0.83 1.12 34.05 
Rubber and Plastics 0.94 1.03 9.87 
Oil Refining 0.29 0.25 -11.77 
Wood and Furniture 0.18 0.19 5.39 
Correlation Coefficient 0.99  
Total Number of Patent Application in Manufacturing 15,019 14,251 -5.11 
Normalised Herfindahl Index of Sectoral Concentration 0.30 0.29  
Share of Vienna in Manufacturing Total [as percentage] 32.16 34.05  
Source: Austrian Patent Office 
 
Fig. 2: Geographical concentration of patents for four manufacturing areas,  
measured by the normalised Herfindahl index [1982-1998] 
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Endnotes 
1  Traditional sectors include food, beverages and tobacco [ISIC 15-16], construction [ISIC 45], stone, clay and glass 
[ISIC 25], textiles and clothing [ISIC 17 and 18], paper, printing and publishing [ISIC 21 - 22] and wood and 
furniture [ISIC 20 and 36]. The mechanical sectors include basic metals [ISIC 27], instruments [ISIC 33], 
transportation vehicles [ISIC 34 - 35], machinery [ISIC 29] and metal products [ISIC 28]. The chemical sectors 
consist of rubber and plastics [ISIC 25], chemistry and pharmaceuticals [ISIC 24] and oil refining [ISIC 23], whereas 
the electronic sectors include electronics [ISIC 32], electrical machinery [ISIC 31] and computers and office 
machines [ISIC 30]. 
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